What can happen in the future?

The scenarios below are analytical "spaces of possibility" (not predictions). They affected by political decisions, military risk and diplomatic initiative.

Scenario A: Controlled de-escalation

• Limitation of target selection and pace, as well as clearer "red lines".
• Mediation via third parties and time-limited measures.
• Focus on air defence/protection rather than further offensive expansion.

Scenario B: Prolonged campaign

• Sustained attacks against missile production, warehouses and maritime capacities.
• Gradual wear and tear on ammunition, air defense and logistics.
• Increased pressure on domestic public opinion, the budget and alliance coordination.

Scenario C: Regional expansion

• More countries are drawn in through bases, airspace or direct attack against critical infrastructure.
• Increased risk of maritime disturbances in strategic waters.
• High probability of unintended events (misidentification, escalating retaliation).

Scenario D: Political change

• Changes in Iranian or US domestic policy may change the direction of the conflict quickly.
• International sanctions, economic and diplomatic pressure compromises can open up agreements – or lock positions.

Decision points to follow

New signals to follow (updated April 14)

• Operating friction: The friendly-fire incident in Kuwait shows that technical/operational risk alone can change the pace of decision-making.
• March 5 signal: Stricter identification routines and shorter warning loops can reduce accident risk, but also increase the need for close coordination between partners.
• Diplomatic window: Higher accident risk may increase the push for de-escalating measures without the main conflict necessarily stopping.
• 6 March signal from the UN: Public warning that the situation can get out of control, with an explicit call for serious negotiations.
• March 10 signal: Continued overnight strikes around Tehran and AP reporting on new cross-regional attacks indicate a prolonged high-intensity phase with sustained stress on regional civilian and energy systems.
• March 17 signal: Confirmed IRGC ballistic missile strike on Al Udeid Air Base (CENTCOM forward HQ) marks the first direct strike on a major U.S. base, raising the threshold for further base-targeting and prompting CENTCOM retaliatory C2 strikes west of Tehran. Scenario B-C overlap elevated.
• March 19 signal: Reported strike on Bandar Abbas port and Iran’s explicit Hormuz closure threat represent the most serious maritime escalation signal to date. IAEA’s suspension of Natanz cooperation reduces nuclear visibility. Muscat talks paused. Scenario C (regional expansion) and D (political change in Iran) now carry greater weight given the combination of port strikes, nuclear opacity and stalled diplomacy.
• Implications for the scenarios: Scenario C (regional expansion) and B (long-term campaign) remain the primary working scenarios; the Bandar Abbas/Hormuz closure threat and IAEA suspension add pressure toward C and potentially D.
• April 6 signal: Technical contacts remain focused on implementable details (corridor verification, incident-response language and maritime deconfliction), indicating continued preference for managed risk reduction over immediate strategic reset.
• April 11 signal: Stable traffic through designated Hormuz lanes and continued limited inspector-access reporting suggest operational stabilization, but no publicly confirmed broad end-state settlement. This keeps Scenario B and C risks relevant despite improved short-term control.
• April 14 signal: Ceasefire consolidation efforts show focus on corridor safety protocols and phased force-posture reduction details. Continued technical team coordination on incident-response procedures and maritime deconfliction checkpoints. Insurance and oil market stabilization reflects improved confidence in pause compliance, though no finalized complete strategic settlement has been announced.

See also Important people for who takes decisions and communicates public lines.